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nvestors and market analysts generally
believe that the yield on a nominal bond
includes an inflation risk premium to com-
pensate investors for bearing the inflation risk
associated with the bond. Knowing how much
of a risk premium investors require on nominal
bonds can be valuable information for policy-
makers. For government Treasuries, the size of
the risk premium represents the potential inter-
est savings for governments when nominal
securities are replaced with real, or inflation-
indexed, securities. And, because the inflation
risk premium reflects perceived inflation
uncertainty, changes in the size of the risk pre-
mium can reveal to monetary policymakers
howcredibletheirpolicyactionsareinthemar-
ketplace. Unfortunately, empirical evidence on
theactualsizeoftheinflationriskpremiumand
its response to market events is scarce.
To address these empirical shortcomings, this
article uses data from the United Kingdom,
where about 20 percent of outstanding govern-
ment debt is in the form of real bonds. The first
sectionshowswhyinvestorsrequireaninflation
risk premium on a nominal bond and how the





UK bonds changed in the fall of 1992, a time
when the government suspended its member-
shipintheEuropeanExchangeRateMechanism
and the monetary authorities adopted explicit
inflation targets.
The article finds that the inflation risk pre-
miuminnominalgovernmentbondsissizable.It
also finds that information regarding the infla-
tion risk premium may give useful insight to
monetary policymakers. In particular, changes
intheestimatedinflationriskpremiumintheUK
in the second half of 1992 suggest that the
announcement of an explicit inflation target did
notgaininstantcredibilitywithfinancialmarket
participants.
I. WHAT IS THE INFLATION RISK
PREMIUM?
Economic theory tells us that, in general, the
real value of a nominal bond declines when
inflation increases unexpectedly. Because most
investors do not like this uncertainty, they
require compensation for bearing the inflation
riskintheformofanadditionalyieldonanomi-
nalbond.Thisadditionalyieldiscalledtheinfla-
tion risk premium. Further, because inflation
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www.kc.frb.org.uncertainty generally increases with the matur-
ity of a nominal bond, the size of the risk pre-
mium should increase with its maturity.
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Investors in nominal bonds bear
inflation risk
The real value of a nominal bond declines
when inflation increases because the nominal
values of its interest payments and principal are
fixed when the bond is issued. Thus, in terms of
real purchasing power, payments to bondhold-
ers decrease when inflation rises and increase
when inflation falls. In other words, the real
yield on a nominal bond varies inversely with
inflation: the real yield is equal to the nominal
yield of the bond less the average inflation rate
during the life of the bond.
An example shows how inflation uncertainty
exposes investors in nominal bonds to inflation
risk.
2 If the nominal yield on a 30-year U.S.
Treasury bond (y
nominal) is 5.5 percent and the
average inflation rate (p) for the 30 years is 2 per-
cent,thentherealyield(y
real)foraninvestorhold-
ing this bond to its maturity will be 3.5 percent:
y
real=y
nominal p=5 . 5-2=3.5.
If inflation over the 30 years averages 3 per-
cent, then the real yield of this bond will be
reduced to 2.5 percent (5.5 - 3). On the other
hand, if actual inflation for the 30-year period
turnsouttobeonly1percent,therealyieldofthe
bond will increase to 4.5 percent (5.5 - 1). This
example shows that even though government
bonds in industrialized countries are generally
free from credit risk, they are still embedded
with inflation risk.
3
The compensation for bearing inflation
risk is the inflation risk premium
Becauseinvestorsaregenerallyriskaverse,an
asset with uncertain future returns is worth less
than an asset that generates the same expected
returns with certainty.
4 If a borrower issues two
bonds with the same expected future real pay-
ments, investors will not be willing to pay as
much for the bond with uncertain future pay-
ments as for the bond with certain future pay-
ments. Consequently, to attract investors, the
bondwithuncertainpaymentsmustofferinves-
tors a better price. In other words, investors
require a higher expected return to compensate
for the risk of uncertain future real returns.
5
Toillustrate,assumearetireehas$500,000in
savings with an investment goal of preserving
the purchasing power of the principal and con-
suming all investment income. If the retiree
invests in a real government bond with a 4 per-
cent real yield, she knows that she can spend all
theinterestincomefromthebond,whichwillbe
a constant $20,000 ($500,000 multiplied by 4
percent) per year in terms of real purchasing
power. She also knows that her principal will
remain at $500,000 in terms of purchasing
power, regardless of the actual inflation level.
By contrast, if she invests in a nominal govern-
ment bond with a 6 percent nominal yield, then
shewillhavetoadjustherconsumptionaccord-
ingtoactualinflation.Iftheactualinflationrate
is 2 percent, the real yield on the bond will be 4





percent. Further, because our retiree typically
knows the actual inflation rate only with a time
lag, she may find herself having consumed too
much or too little in hindsight.
6 Consequently,
even if our retiree expects average inflation for
thelifeofthebondtobe2percent,whichmeans
the real yields on both bonds are expected to be
thesame,thenominalbondwillbelessattractive
to her because of its uncertain real yield.
For this reason, our retiree will invest in the
nominal bond only if it offers an expected yield
higherthan6percent.Usingsimilarnotationsas
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nominalbethenominalyieldonanomi-
nal bond, y
realthe real yield requested by inves-
tors, and p







in additional expected yield is enough compen-
sation for the risk, and she is representative of
general investors, then the market price for the
nominalbondwillbesuchthatthenominalyield
of the bond will equal 6.5 percent. That is, the
inflationriskpremiumforthisparticularbondis
0.5percent.Thus,therearethreecomponentsin





with RP being the inflation risk premium.
The inflation risk premium tends to
increase with maturity
The inflation risk of a nominal bond, and
hence its inflation risk premium, tends to
increase with the maturity of the bond for two
reasons.First,itisusuallymoredifficulttofore-
cast inflation in the distant future.
7 In the short
term, the level of inflation is heavily influenced
by past levels of inflation and the recent history
of monetary policy. In the long term, average
inflationisprimarilydeterminedbythestanceof
monetary policy, which is determined by both
monetary policymakers and, ultimately, in a
democratic society, the public support for con-






while recent history of inflation and monetary
policycanhelpforecastinflationforthenextfew
years, their usefulness diminishes as the fore-
casting horizon increases. Because forecasting
future inflation is a key factor when investors
determine the appropriate nominal yield of a
bond,thelongertheforecasthorizonis,themore
likely it is that forecasts will be wrong.
Second, inflation risk increases with the
maturity of a bond because the same magnitude
of forecast error results in a larger cost to inves-
tors in long-term bonds than in short-term
bonds. For example, assume investors expect
futureinflationtoaverage2percent.Ifaninves-
tor buys a $1,000 nominal bond with a maturity
ofoneyearandanominalyieldof5percent,she
will get $1,050 at the end of the year, which,
when adjusted for inflation, will be roughly
$1,030 in real terms.
8 However, if actual infla-
tionturnsouttobe3percent,therealpurchasing
power of the $1,050 will be only $1,020. Thus,
thecosttotheinvestorduetohermistakeinfore-
castingfutureinflationis$10.Incontrast,ifshe
buys a 10-year nominal bond with a 5 percent
annual yield, the same error of underpredicting
inflation by one percentage point will cost her
$10 every year for the next ten years.
9
II. ESTIMATING THE INFLATION
RISK PREMIUM USING UK DATA
Governments in many industrialized coun-
tries have accumulated huge amounts of debt
due to years of deficit spending. For example, the





real bonds, or inflation-indexed gilts, since 1981.
Today, about 20 percent of the outstanding UK
government debt is in the form of real bonds.
Australia, Canada, France, Sweden, and the
UnitedStateshavealsobeguntoissuesomeform
ofrealbonds(usuallycalledindexedbonds),but
such bonds form only a miniscule portion of
their total outstanding government debts.
11
Thepresenceofrealbondsmakesitpossibleto
estimate the inflation risk premium in nominal
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1998 37bonds. As shown earlier, the yield on a nominal
governmentbondincludesatleastthreecompo-
nents: the real yield required by investors, the
average future inflation expected by investors,
and the inflation risk premium required by inves-
tors. With both nominal and real government
bondsbeingactivelytradedinthefinancialmar-
kets, the nominal and real yields can be directly
observed from the bond markets.
12 The differ-
ence in the yields of nominal and real bonds,
therefore, is simply the sum of expected infla-
tion and the inflation risk premium. For exam-
ple, if we observe that the market yield for a
10-year real government bond is 3.5 percent,
then it is reasonable to assume the real yield
component in a 10-year nominal government
bondisalso3.5percent.Thus,ifwealsoobserve
that the market yield for the 10-year nominal
governmentbondis6percent,weknowtheyield
difference of 2.5 percent between the nominal
and real bonds should be the sum of only two
components: expected future inflation and the
inflation risk premium.
13 Therefore, if we can
separate the expected future inflation component,
theremainingpartoftheyielddifferencewillbe
theinflationriskpremiuminthenominalbond.
In theory, we could use data on the nominal
and real U.S. Treasury securities and inflation
expectations to estimate the inflation risk pre-
mium in nominal U.S. government bonds.
14
However, the results would be unreliable
because the market for real bonds in the United
Statesisquitenewandittakestimeforinvestors
to understand new instruments. In particular,
twofactorsmayaffectyieldsonU.S.realbonds
differently from yields on nominal bonds. One
factor is that the real bond market is still small
and not very liquid. In comparison, the nominal
U.S. Treasury bond market is one of the largest
andmostliquidmarketsintheworld.Therefore,
the yield on the real bond is likely to include a
sizable compensating liquidity premium. The
otherfactoristhatthecurrentparticipantsinthe
realbondmarketmaybequitedifferentfromthe
participants in the nominal bond market.
Because real bonds are relatively new in the
UnitedStates,itislikelythatinvestorswhoven-
ture into the new market are relatively more
sophisticated or have different risk preferences
than traditional bond investors. These differ-
ences are sometimes called the clientele effect,
meaning that comparison across markets might
be less informative because the two markets
serve different clientele.
15
Recent data from the UK nominal and real
government bond markets, however, are less
likely to suffer the same limitations because
inflation-indexed gilts have existed there since
1981. Presumably, UK investors have gained
enough experience and knowledge with real
bonds so that the yield difference between the
UK nominal and real government bonds should
primarily reflect the fundamental factors of
inflation expectations and the inflation risk pre-





expect + RP. Therefore, this article will use
recentdatafromtheUKgovernmentbondmar-
kets to estimate the inflation risk premium
embeddedinnominalUKgovernmentbonds.
16
Because yield differences of nominal and
indexed government bonds are the sum of
expected future inflation and the inflation risk
premium, some assumptions must be made
regarding inflation expectations in order to use
theyielddifferencetoestimatetheinflationrisk
premium.Thisarticleusestwodifferenttypesof
assumptions about inflation expectations. First,
the inflation expectation component is derived
from surveys of inflation expectations. This
approach assumes that inflation expectations
according to survey data are the same as the
inflation expectations embedded in the yield of
nominal bonds. Second, the inflation expecta-
tionisderivedbyusingthegoalofthemonetary
authorities.Thatis,theexpectedinflationinthe
market yield of nominal bonds is assumed to be
thesameasthegoalofthemonetaryauthorities.
38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYInflation risk premia using survey data on
expected future inflation
Onewaytofindouttheinflationriskpremium





Consensus Economics Inc., which are based on
the average of survey results from roughly 30
financial institutions and forecast groups. The
Consensus Forecasts include both forecasts of
annual inflation rates for each of the next five
yearsandaforecastoftheaverageinflationrate
for the period five to ten years ahead.
One problem with using the Consensus Fore-
castsisthattheydonotforecastbeyondtenyears
in the future.
17 Hence, additional assumptions
must be made about the path of inflation in the
distant future. In this article, it is assumed that
average expected inflation five to ten years
aheadisthesameastheaverageexpectedinfla-
tion for 10 to 15 years ahead, or 15 to 20 years
ahead,andsoon.Thatis,theforecastoftheaver-
ageinflationrateovertheperiodfivetotenyears
ahead is used as the expectation of the annual
inflation rate for all periods beyond ten years.
18
Given these assumptions, the survey data can
be used to calculate the expected inflation
rate,p
expect,foranyfutureperiodastheaverageof
the annual expected inflation rates within the
period.
19 Taking this as the proxy for the corre-
sponding market expected inflation, p
expect, and
subtracting it from y
nominal y
real gives the esti-
mated inflation risk premium at the respective
maturity.
Table1showstheestimatedinflationriskpre-








was 3.851 percent for 10-year gilts, 3.995 per-
cent for 15-year gilts, 4.084 percent for 20-year
gilts, and 4.146 percent for 25-year gilts, as
shownincolumn1.Inotherwords,theyielddif-
ference curve was upward sloping.
Column2ofTable1showstheexpectedaver-
age inflation rates for the periods 10 years, 15
years,20years,and25yearsahead.Theseinfla-
tionratesarecalculatedbyaveragingtheannual
expected inflation for each time period. The
annual expected inflation for the first five years
is reported in the Consensus Forecasts, and the
annual inflation rates beyond five years are
assumed to be the same as the forecast for aver-
ageinflationforfivetotenyearsahead.Because
inflation expectations are basically constant
after five years, the main difference in the aver-
age expected inflation rates for the periods in
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Table 1
RISK PREMIUM (1996-97)








(3) = (1)  (2)
10 3.851 3.106 .74
15 3.995 3.104 .89
20 4.084 3.103 .98
25 4.146 3.103 1.04Table 1 is the relative weights of the inflation
ratesinthefirstfiveyears,whichdecreaseasthe
period becomes longer.
Once average expected inflation for each
maturity,p
expect, is determined, the inflation risk
premiumcomponentintheyieldsofthenominal
gilts can be calculated simply by subtracting
p
expect from the yield difference. Consequently,
the inflation risk premium is roughly 0.74 per-
cent for 10-year gilts, 0.89 percent for 15-year
gilts,0.98percentfor20-yeargilts,and1.04per-
cent for 25-year gilts, as shown in the column 3
ofthetable.Becausetheaverageexpectedinfla-
tion rates for long periods are fairly stable, the
increases in the yield differences primarily
reflectincreasesintheinflationriskpremium.
21
Inflation risk premia based on the goal of
the monetary authorities
Theexpectedfutureinflationbasedonsurvey
data may not be the best proxy for the expected
inflation embedded in the nominal yields. Sur-
veyforecastsreflecttheopinionofasmallgroup
of experts, but the actual inflation expectations
embeddedinthenominalyieldsreflecttheaver-
ageopinionofmillionsofinvestors.Analterna-
tive way to specify the inflation expectations in
the distant future is to use the goal of the mone-
tary authorities as the inflation expectations of
the market.
Under this approach, it is also necessary to
specifywhenandhowinflationwillconvergeto
its long-run target level. One possibility is to
assume that the market expects annual inflation
to converge linearly from its current level to the
long-rungoalofthemonetaryauthoritiesinfive
years.
22 Just as before, the average expected
inflationforagivenmaturityisthentheaverage
of the annual expected inflation.
Table2presentsestimatesoftheinflationrisk
premia using these alternative assumptions. In
particular, the long-term convergent level of
inflation is assumed to be equal to the Bank of
Englands targeted inflation level of 2.5 per-
cent.
23Column2showsaverageexpectedinflation
rates for maturities of 10, 15, 20, and 25 years.




24 Using this scenario of expected infla-
tion, the inflation risk premium is higher: 1.33
percent for the 10-year gilts, 1.48 percent for
15-year gilts,1.57percent for20-year gilts,and
1.64 percent for 25-year gilts.
25
Chart 1 summarizes Tables 1 and 2. The top
curve of the chart is the yield differences for
maturities from 5 to 25 years. The bottom two
curves show the inflation risk premia at these
maturities. The curve derived from survey data
liesbelowthecurvederivedfromassumingcredi-
ble monetary policy. Both are upward sloping,
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Table 2
RISK PREMIUM (1996-97)








(3) = (1)  (2)
10 3.851 2.525 1.33
15 3.995 2.517 1.48
20 4.084 2.512 1.57
25 4.146 2.510 1.64reflectingapositiverelationshipbetweentheinfla-
tionriskpremiumandthematurityofthebond.
Implications for policymakers
In general, the UK data suggest that the infla-
tion risk premium can be sizable. The inflation
risk premium for 10-year nominal gilts is likely
tobeintherangeof0.7to1.4percentagepoints;
for20-yeargiltstherangeislikelytobebetween
1 to 1.6 percentage points. Such a sizable infla-
tionriskpremiumhasimportantimplicationsto
both fiscal and monetary policymakers.
For fiscal policymakers, the size of the infla-
tionriskpremiumimpliesthatagovernmentcan
generally save interest expenses by increasing
the proportion of its debt in real bonds. For
example, if the UK government were to switch
anadditionalbillionpoundsofoutstandingdebt
from nominal 20-year gilts to indexed 20-year
gilts, it would save around 10 to 16 million
pounds of interest payment annually.
26
For monetary policymakers, the size of the




term, the size of the inflation risk premium in
long-term bonds is closely tied to the markets
beliefofhowcommittedthecountrysmonetary
authorities are in controlling long-term infla-
tion.
27 Thus, the size of the inflation risk pre-
mium in long-term nominal bonds is a measure
of the credibility of the monetary authorities.
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Chart 1
YIELD DIFFERENCES AND INFLATION RISK PREMIUM (RP)
Maturity
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Percent PercentIn the case of the United Kingdom, the impli-
cationfromtheestimatesofinflationriskpremia
is that the credibility of its monetary authorities
is still limited. The UK monetary authorities
have been announcing explicit inflation targets
sincethefallof1992.Forthetimeperiodstudied
here,1996-97,thetargetedlevelwascommonly
regarded as 2.5 percent. Nevertheless, the Con-
sensus Forecasts of long-term inflation were
usually higher than 2.5 percent. Further, even if
one is willing to disregard survey forecasts
andassumethatinflationexpectationsbuiltinto
the market yields converge to the inflation tar-
get, this still suggests that the inflation risk
premia on gilts with maturities of at least ten
years are more than 1.33 percent. This is a siz-
ablepremiuminthesensethatitisabouthalfof
the target level of inflation. In other words, if
market participants believe the UK monetary
authorities will try to keep inflation at the target
level,theyprobablyalsobelievetheprobability
is high that monetary policymakers will miss
their target.
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III.HOW DID THE INFLATION RISK




can help monetary authorities gauge how credi-
ble their commitment to controlling inflation
appearstothepublic.Inparticular,changesin
the size of the inflation risk premium largely
reflect changes in the perceived uncertainty
about future inflation by market participants,
which in turn reflects the credibility of mone-
tary policy. For example, an increase in the
inflation risk premium may suggest there is
increasing uncertainty about the monetary
authoritiescommitmenttotheirpolicygoals.If
the monetary policymakers can ascertain this
information promptly, they may be able to
reduce such uncertainty by better communicat-





and thus make monetary policy more efficient
and effective.
Thissectionwillusedatafromthesecondhalf
of 1992 in UK government bond markets to
showhowtheinflationriskpremiumchanged
in response to changes in the framework of
monetary policy in the UK. The data suggest
that the inflation risk perceived by financial
market participants increased substantially in
the transition period, and that the introduction
of inflation targeting did not gain immediate
credibility.
TheframeworkformonetarypolicyintheUK
changed significantly during the second half of
1992.Atthebeginningoftheperiod,theUKwas
a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) for the European Monetary System and
was expected to remain a member. Because
investorsgenerallybelievedthatfortheERMto
be successful, the long-run average inflation
rates of its member countries had to be close to
the long-run average inflation rate of Germany,
the credibility of the UK monetary policy
dependedcriticallyonitsforeignexchangepol-
icy. In particular, if investors then believed the
UK would remain in the ERM, they would also
believe that the long-term inflation rate for the
UK would converge to the long-term inflation
rate in Germany.
29
This framework changed dramatically when
the UK government announced its decision to
withdraw its ERM membership on September
16, 1992. Then, in the following month, for the
firsttimeinitshistorytheUKmonetaryauthori-
tiesannouncedanexplicitinflationtarget.Ifthe
new framework of inflation targeting had been
credible, the market would have expected, with
little uncertainty, the long-run inflation rate to
move toward the target level, which was regarded
by most market participants as 2.5 percent.
30
42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYChart 2 shows how expected inflation and the
inflation risk premium changed for 10-year
nominal gilts in the second half of 1992. As
shownbytheheightofthebars,theyielddiffer-
ence between the nominal and real gilts
increased substantially between July and
November, rising by nearly a half percentage
point.Becausetheyielddifferenceisthesumof
expected future inflation and the inflation risk
premium, its increase suggests that at least one
ofitstwocomponents,orpossiblybothcompo-
nents, had increased. Decomposing the yield
differenceaccordingtosurveydatasuggeststhat




the yield difference using the targeted level of
2.5 percent of the monetary authorities sug-
geststhattheincreaseintheyielddifferencewas
due entirely to the increase in the inflation risk
premium.
Chart 3 shows the values of similar variables
for the 20-year maturity. The yield difference at
this maturity increased even more dramatically
betweentheendofJulyandNovember,risingby
more than a full percentage point. Further, both
methods of decomposition of the yield differ-
ence for the 20-year maturity suggest sizable
increases in the inflation risk premium. Taken
together, Charts 2 and 3 suggest that the change
in the framework of monetary policy was
accompanied by an increase in inflation risk in
themarket,andthattheintroductionofinflation
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Julytargeting did not immediately reduce inflation
uncertainty.
32
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article provides estimates of the sizes of
inflation risk premia using yield data in the UK
government bond markets. It suggests that in
generaltherearesizableinflationriskpremiain
nominal government bonds. For example, the
inflation risk premium in 20-year UK nominal
gilts has been in the range of 1.0 to 1.6 percent-
age points in recent years.
The article also shows that information
regarding the inflation risk premium may pro-
videusefulinsighttomonetarypolicymakers.In
particular, movements in inflation risk premia
suggest that the perceived inflation uncertainty
increased at the transition period when the
framework of UK monetary policy was
changed. Further, the introduction of inflation
targeting did not immediately reduce inflation
uncertaintyinthemarketplace,whichisconsis-
tent with the general view that it takes time for
inflation targeting to gain credibility with the
public.
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tends to be more closely related to its duration than
maturity. Ignoring this distinction will not be a problem in
the empirical analysis, as the data are all in the form of
zero-coupon equivalent bonds, for which maturity and
durationarethesame.Forsimplicityofexposition,theterm
maturity will be used throughout the article.
2 The words “risk” and “uncertainty” in the article are
largely interchangeable. There are no fundamental
distinctions as defined by Frank Knight (1921) intended
here.
3 While all nominal bonds have inflation risk, this article
will focus the discussion on government bonds in
industrializedcountriessincetheyareconsideredtobefree
fromdefaultrisk;thustheinflationriskisthemajorriskin
these bonds. In contrast, corporate bonds and government
bonds from emerging markets usually also have default
risk;thustheriskpremiuminthesebondswillhavetocover
both inflation risk and default risk.
4 Even risk-neutral investors may not like uncertainty
whenitleadsto“temporalrisk.”Temporalriskariseswhen
investors have to take actions before the uncertainty is
resolved.Evenrisk-neutralinvestorswillnotliketemporal
riskbecausetheoptimalactionexantemaynotbeoptimal
ex post. For example, suppose a consumer shopping for a
holiday vacation likes two vacation packages equally—
one to a Rocky Mountain ski resort, the other to Florida
beaches.Sayeachwillcost$2,000,butshewillonlyneedto
pay$1,990ifsheiswillingtotaketheoutcomeofacointoss
between the two at the time of purchase. A risk-neutral
consumer will take the deal with the coin toss because it is
cheaper.Nevertheless,sheisnotlikelytotakethedealifshe
istoldthatshewillnotknowtheresultofthecointossuntil
the night before the vacation starts. The reason is that she
needs to pack for the vacation and not knowing which
vacation she needs to pack for well in advance is costly.
5 In a world with many financial assets, independent
idiosyncraticriskcanbediversifiedaway.Thatis,investors
canassembleaportfoliothatcandelivertheexpectedreturn
with almost certainty. Therefore, in the real world, only
risksthatarecorrelatedandthuscannotbediversifiedaway
will be compensated. Inflation risk is one of such risks.
6 There is also the logistical inconvenience of having to
reinvest some of the nominal interest income to keep the
principal intact in terms of purchasing power.
7 The time horizon here is generally in terms of years. In
termsofmonths,itmaybeeasiertoforecastinflationfor12
monthsaheadthanforthenextmonth.Thereasonisthat,on
a monthly basis, some random events may have a huge
effectontheaggregatepricelevel,butsuchrandomeffects
aremorelikelytocanceleachotheroutonanannualbasis.
8 For simplicity, assume the bond is bought at par.
9 Even if the investor tries to sell the bond before its
maturity once it is obvious that the forecast is wrong, she
willstillsufferthesamelossbecausethemarketpriceofthe
bond will then be well below par to account for the much
lower expected real yield over the remaining life of the
bond.
10 Theoutstandingfederaldebtwascloseto$5.6trillionat
the end of June 1998. The federal debt is the total
accumulation of past budget deficits. Even though the
consolidatedbudgetdeficitintheUnitedStateshasturned
tosurplusforfiscalyear1998,theaccumulatedoutstanding
debt is still significant, equivalent to around 70 percent of
the annual U.S. gross domestic product.
11 For a more detailed discussion on U.S. indexed bonds,
see Shen (1998).
12 Thediscussionignoresthepossibilitythattheremaybea
liquidity premium in the yields of real bonds. Because the
nominal government bond market tends to be much more
liquid than the real bond market, investors may require an
additional premium in the yield of the real bond to
compensatethemforholdingthelessliquidasset.Theissue
ofliquiditypremiumisalsoignoredintheestimationofthe
inflation risk premium but is discussed in endnote 26.
13 Again, the market yields on both bonds should be their
zero-coupon equivalent yields.
14 Technically,U.S.Treasurysecuritieswithmaturityfrom
one year to ten years are called Treasury notes; only those
with maturity above ten years are called Treasury bonds.
Forsimplicity,theywillallbecalledbondsinthisarticle.
15 These factors are likely to be temporary. The U.S.
Treasury has committed to developing the indexed bond
market. Thus, investors will understand the new securities
and the new market better over time, which means the
liquidity premium and the clientele effect are likely to
decline.Foradetaileddiscussionontheeffectsofliquidity,
clientele, and taxes, see Shen (1995).
16 The author is grateful to the Bank of England for
providing the yield data. For details about the data, see
Deacon and Derry (1994).
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United States, also do not go beyond ten years.
18 This seems like a fairly reasonable assumption,
especiallyforthetimeperiodusedinthissection(Tables1
and 2). However, there are times when assuming constant
future inflation appears somewhat questionable, and a
different path of future inflation beyond ten years may be
more appropriate. This article does not explore such
alternatives.
19 For example, the average expected inflation for the
period of 20 years will be equal to 1/20 x
( ppppp p 12345 15 51 0
eeeee e +++++´- ). The subscripts 1
through5represent,respectively,expectedannualinflation
rates for years 1 through 5 ahead, and the subscript 5-10
representstheaverageexpectedannualinflationrateforthe
period5to10yearsahead,asreportedinthesurveydata.
20 The hidden assumption here is that the relationship
between inflation expectations and the inflation risk




in the perception of the uncertainty about future inflation,
or both. Consequently, it may not be meaningful simply to
calculate the average of the inflation risk premium. This
concern is the main reason that the article does not use all
the data that are available. The author has repeated the
estimationinTables1and2withalongertimeperiod,from
January1995toApril1998,whichisthelastobservationin
the data set. The results are almost identical.
21 Notice that the increase of the inflation risk premium
with maturity is consistent with the earlier theoretical
discussion.
22 Assuming convergence in five years seems arbitrary.
One way to think about the issue is that if the annual
autoregressivecoefficientoftheinflationtimeseriesis0.7,
one percentage point of difference today will only be 0.17
percentage point of difference five years later, which is
fairly small. Because the focus of the risk premium is for
maturities of at least ten years, assuming slower
convergence, such as convergence in ten years, gives very
similar results. An alternative approach is to assume that
the average inflation rate for the distant future will
converge to the goal level of the monetary authorities,
which implies that, in the long run, the monetary
policymakers will overshoot and undershoot their goal
withequalprobabilities.Thisassumptiontendstoleadtoa
steeper sloped inflation risk premia for the UK data.
23 The exact meaning of the inflation target in United
Kingdom has been changing over time. For a detailed
discussion on the topic, see Bowen (1995) and Kahn and
Parrish (1998).
24Forexample,iftheactualinflationrateatthebeginning
of the period was 3 percent, then the expected annual
inflation would be 2.9 percent for one year ahead, 2.8
percent for two years ahead, 2.7 percent for three years
ahead,2.6percentforfouryearsahead,and2.5percentfor
five years ahead and beyond. As a result, the average
inflationratefortheentireperiodwouldbehigherthan2.5
percent.
25 If we are also willing to assume that the inflation risk
premiumfollowssomeparticularfunctionalform,wemay
beabletocometoatighterbound.Forexample,theslopeof
the inflation risk premium also provides useful
information. It may be reasonable to assume that the slope
of the inflation risk premium is positively related to the
level of the inflation risk premium at a given maturity.
Further, it may also be reasonable to assume that the
inflationriskpremiumislikelytoincreasewiththelevelof
expected future inflation. In this article, neither of these
possibilities will be explored.
26Incalculatingtheinflationriskpremium,itisimplicitly
assumed that all other factors are negligible. In particular,




the estimated inflation risk premium may be understated.
On the other hand, the tax code in the UK favors indexed
gilts over nominal gilts. In particular, while the
appreciation of the principals of indexed gilts is excluded
from both income and capital gains taxes, all interest
income in nominal gilts is subject to income taxes,
includingtheparttocoverexpectedinflation.Becausesuch
taxbiasesarenotaccountedfor,theestimatedinflationrisk
premium may be overstated. The overstatement, however,
is likely to be limited because pension funds are major
playersinbothnominalandrealgiltsmarkets,andpension
funds are exempted from both income and capital gains
taxesderivedfromgilts.Thus,theneteffectoftheliquidity
premium and tax bias is likely to be small.
27 In the short term, inflation could be heavily influenced
by factors not controlled by monetary policymakers, such
asanoilcrisis.Inthelongterm,theaverageinflationrateis
primarily determined by the stance of monetary policy.
28 The credibility of the monetary authorities can be
characterizedbytherepresentativeprobabilitydistribution
that market participants attach to the average long-term
inflation rate, which specifies the probability that the
long-runaverageinflationwillbeinthetargetrange.While
aprobabilitydistributioncanbedescribedbyitsmoments,
46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsuchasitsmean,variance,skewness,etc.,empirically,itis
verydifficulttoseparateshiftsinthevariousmoments.For
example,themarketyielddataalonedonotcontainenough
information to tell a shift in the mean from a shift in the
variance of the probability distribution. Therefore, in the
text, when survey data are not used, it is assumed that the
monetary authorities’ target is equal to the mean of the
distribution. Under this approach, the probability that the
monetary authorities will miss their target is mainly
reflected in the variance of the distribution, which is
captured by the risk premium.
29 Foradetaileddiscussionoftheissue,seeBowen(1995),
Kahn and Parrish (1998), and McCallum (1996). In the
empiricalcalculationspresentedbelow,thefutureinflation
rateforGermanyisassumedtobeconstantforfiveyearsor
beyond and equal to the Consensus Forecast for the
five-to-ten-year average of 2.7 percent.
30 In reality, the actual level of targeted inflation was
somewhat complicated, as both intermediate and long-run
targets were introduced. For details, see Bowen (1995).
31 The level of expected future inflation, however, was
much higher than the announced inflation target. Survey
data could be somewhat misleading here as they were
reportedinOctober,whichmayhavebeencollectedbefore
the announcement of the new framework of inflation
targeting.
32 It is not surprising that the inflation target at the end of
November 1992 did not gain much confidence in the
marketplace.Ingeneral,monetaryauthoritiescanonlygain
credibility by their consistent actions in controlling
inflation. Announcements alone are not very useful.
Further, setting up and announcing an explicit target level
of inflation was a new experiment at the time and market
participants had not had much experience with it. Table 2
usedmorerecentdataandconfirmedthegeneralviewthat
the monetary authorities in the UK have gained
considerablecredibilitywithinflationtargetingsince1992.
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